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I. Introduction




















Let’s	 suppose,	 too,	 that	 your	 friend	 isn’t	oblivious	or	 totally	beyond	













sented	in	A Theory of Reasons for Action	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1971).	
Also,	consider	Aristotle’s	view	of	friendship,	according	to	which	the	highest	
form	of	philia is	strictly	reserved	for	the	virtuous.






egoistic	 concern	 of	 yours	 (perhaps,	 for	 example,	 you	 are	 really	 just	
worried	about	your	own	moral	reputation)	is	preventing	you	from	see-
ing	your	friend	as	the	decent	person	he	really	is.	As	Murdoch	reminds	









































him	and	 spur	his	 feelings	of	 shame.	What	 is	 interesting	about	 such	
cases	is	that	though	they	seem	to	simply	yield	a	hostile	environment	
for	 human	 connection,	 love	 can	 still	make	 communion	 or	 intimacy	




puzzle.	The	first	 is	 that,	 ideally,	 love	encourages	and	 fosters	 connec-
tion	 and	 communion	 rather	 than	 estrangement	 between	 its	 parties,	
and	second,	that	one	centrally	important	and	desirable	aspect	of	love,	
discussed	by	Iris	Murdoch,	is	that	it	is	attentive,	where	the	ambition	of	




vealed,	even	 to	 those	we	 love	and	are	 loved	by.	Or	 rather,	especially	 to	
those	we	love	and	are	loved	by:	to	other	people	it	is	easy	not	to	be	known.	
“The	Avoidance	of	Love”	in	Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays 
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1969),	284.
4.	 Iris	Murdoch,	The Sovereignty of Good (New	York:	Routledge,	2001).	Murdoch’s	
ideal	has	been	discussed	by,	among	others,	Martha	Nussbaum,	David	Velle-
man,	and	Susan	Wolf.	Nussbaum,	 “‘This	 story	 isn’t	 true’:	Madness,	Reason,	
and	Recantation	in	the Phaedrus”	in	The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in 
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001).	
Velleman,	“Love	as	a	moral	emotion”,	Ethics,	109:2	(1999).	Wolf,	“Loving	At-
tention:	Lessons	 in	Love	 from	The Philadelphia Story”	 in	Understanding Love: 




ones,	but	include	the	qualities of human nature.	
II. Shame, Vision, and Alienation
Let	me	begin	by	describing	the	problem	in	more	detail,	which	I	will	
refer	to	as	the problem of alienation.	Importantly,	this	problem	is	distinct	
from	another	that	has	drawn	most,	if	not	all,	contemporary	philosophi-
cal	discussions	of	love:	the	question	of	the	justifiability or	rationality of	
loving	another	human	being,	either	 in	 contrast	 to	others	 (imagined	
to	be	just	as	lovable)	or	given	the	impartial	demands	of	morality.	This	
narrowing	of	our	focus	has	been,	I	think,	a	profound	mistake.	My	dis-


















	 In	 this	 spirit,	 I	offer	a	nontheological	 conception	of	grace	or	gracious	 love,	






11.	 While	 “intimacy”	 is	 ambiguous,	 I	 shall	 focus	 on	 connection	 and	 communion, 







But	 I	 shall	argue	 that	attentive	 love,	 though	seeming	 to	give	 rise	
to	the	puzzle,	is	the	way	out	of	it	as	well.	Although	it	may	appear	as	
though	 less	 attentive	 forms	 could	 re-establish	 connection	 between	
lovers	 in	 such	 cases,	 I	will	 argue	 that	 they	 cannot	 precisely	because 
they	are	 insufficiently	attentive,	and	because	of	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	be	
ashamed	of	who	you	are.	Rather	than	give	up	on	the	ideal	of	attentive	
love	in	light	of	this	problem,	I	argue	instead	that	we	should	reconsider	








7.	 Aristotle’s	 taxonomy	of	 friendships	might	 allow	 for	 you	 to	 continue	 being	
friends	in	this	case,	as	long	as	it	was	not	a	“character”	friendship,	leaving	only	
the	 possibility	 of	 either	 a	 relatively	 shallow	 friendship	 of	 pleasure	 or	 rela-
tively	depressing	friendship	of	utility.	
8.	 The	Irrationalist	position	that	we	do	not	love	for	reasons	at	all	has	been	most	
recently	and	prominently	defended	by	Harry	Frankfurt	 in	Necessity, Volition, 
and Love	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999)	and	The Reasons of 
Love (Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2004).
9.	 Niko	Kolodny,	“Love	as	Valuing	a	Relationship”,	The Philosophical Review,	112:2	
(2003).
10.	 Robert	Merrihew	Adams,	Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics	(Ox-
ford:	Oxford	University	 Press,	 1999).	 There	 is	 nearly	 no	work	 on	 grace	 in	
contemporary	analytic	moral	philosophy,	with	Adams	and	Glen	Pettigrove	
as	 rare	exceptions.	Pettigrove,	Forgiveness and Love	 (Oxford:	Oxford	Univer-
sity	Press,	2012).	The	fact	that	I	propose	a	secular	or	interpersonal conception	
of	grace	gives	rise	to	an	important	worry.	One	ought	to	wonder:	is	it	really	



























14. Shame and Necessity (Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press,	
2008),	89.	
15.	 As	T.	M.	Scanlon	writes,	 “…	the	pain	of	guilt	 involves,	at	base,	a	 feeling	of	
estrangement,	of	having	violated	the	requirements	of	a	valuable	relation	with	




























partly	 authoritative,	 (ii)	 an	embodiment	of	 a	 real	 social	 expectation,	
and	(iii)	a	person	with	whom	the	ashamed	person	can	partly	identify.	











and	Gender”	in	Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Op-
pression (New	York:	Routledge,	1990).

































ing	else”,	The Sovereignty of Good,	30.	For	discussion	of	this	observation,	see	
Samantha	Vice,	“The	Ethics	of	Self-Concern”	in	Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment, 
Anne	Rowe	(ed.)	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007).
another;	 guilt	 is	 the	pained	 recognition	of	what	 one	has	 done,	 and	
perhaps	of	 the	damage	one	has	done	 to	one’s	 relationship	with	 the	












Shame,	 however,	 is	 more	 complicated,	 and	 the	 route	 from	 the	













to	 engage	with	 the	 person	who	 is	 ashamed,	 but	 rather,	 to	withdraw	
16.	 Herbert	Morris,	 “Shame	 and	Guilt”	 in	On Guilt and Innocence:	Essays in Le-
gal Philosophy and Moral Psychology	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	
1976).
17.	 For	discussion	of	this	point	about	angry	blame,	see	Samuel	Reis-Dennis,	“An-
ger:	Scary	Good”,	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97:3	(2019). 
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a	good	heart-to-heart.	Should	a	cool-headed	conversation	fail	to	move	











subject	 to	 forces	and	motives	 that	make	him	a	victim	of	his	 circum-
stance,	brain	chemistry,	or	even	of	himself.	Seeing	a	person	in	these	






well-disposed	person,	 in	 an	 effort	 of	 self-protection,	might	 not	 take	
well	at	all	to	your	compassion		it	may	only	be	an	insult.23 
In	 contrast	 to	 tough	 love	 and	 compassion,	 the	 answer	 I	 shall	 ex-
plore	is	attentive love. According	to	Murdoch,	the	task	of	really	seeing 
22.	 Bernard	Williams,	“Internal	Reasons	and	the	Obscurity	of	Blame”	in	Making 




reton,	“Offensive	Beneficence”,	Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 
2:1	 (2016).	Part	 of	 the	 explanation	 is	 that	 to	 view	a	person	 compassionately 
involves,	at	least	on	standard	conceptions,	seeing	him	as	a	patient	rather	than	




But	 another	 difficulty	 is	 that	 the	 ashamed	 person	may	 be	 partly	








and	malice	—	but	given	that	 I	 just	am	 this	envious,	arrogant	and	ma-
licious	person,	 I	may	 feel	ashamed	while	also challenging	 the	moral	
gaze	which	issues	this	assessment,	and	which	I	am	ashamed	in	light	
of.21	 In	wanting	to	disappear	from	the	view	of	others,	 then,	 I	am	not	
simply	trying	to	avoid	the	pain	of	being	seen	by	them	—	I	may	also,	in	a	
last-ditch	effort	at	self-respect	and	defiance,	be	trying	to	protect myself.	






alienation	 and	 estrangement	 exacerbated	 by	 his	 shame?	What	 reac-
tions	are	available	to	those	who	see	him	as	he	is?	




21.	 Consider	how	in	The Symposium, Alcibiades,	wracked	with	shame	and	desire,	




the	status	of	 things	 that	are	good	and	which	constitute	 the	good aspects	of	
who	we	are.	Susan	Wolf,	“Moral	Saints”,	Journal of Philosophy,	79:8	(1982).	




































The Second-Person Standpoint:	Morality, Respect, and Accountability	(Cambridge,	
MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006).	Merritt,	“Love,	Respect,	and	Individu-




























25.	 “I	 don’t	want	 to	 change	 you/	 I	 don’t	want	 to	 change	 you/	 I	 don’t	want	 to	
change	your	mind/	I	just	came	across	a	manger/	Where	there	is	no	the	dan-
ger/	Where	 love	has	eyes	and	 is	not	blind”.	Damien	Rice,	 “I	don’t	want	 to	





Public Affairs: 13:2	(1984).	Piper,	“Moral	Theory	and	Moral	Alienation”,	Journal 
of Philosophy, 84:2	(1987).	
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sake,	 can	 be	 done	 without	 affection,	 without	 enthusiasm		 some-














case	 I	 started	with,	where	we	 can	 imagine	 that	 precisely	what	 is	 at	
31.	 “To	be	 committed	 to	meeting	 children’s	demand	 for	preservation	does	not	
require	enthusiasm	or	even	 love;	 it	 simply	means	 to	 see	vulnerability	 and	
to	respond	to	 it	with	care	than	abuse,	 indifference,	or	flight”.	Sara	Ruddick,	







asms are not essential.	Nor is it essential that a person like what he loves.	He	may	


















recognizes	 that,	 after	all,	 she	owes	 it	 to	you	 to	pay	you	a	visit.	And	






















you.	She	 just	doesn’t	 like you.	Smith,	 “Guilty	Thoughts”	 in	Morality and the 
Emotions,	Carla	Bagnoli	(ed.)	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011).
30.	Stocker,	465,	fn.	9.






















that	may	make	him	easier	or	more	appropriate	 to	 love	according	 to	
this	view,	he	is	also	alienated by	certain	forms	of	 love,	 including	this	
one.	They	have	driven	him	from	his	home.	
33.	 “Love	as	a	Reactive	Emotion”,	The Philosophical Quarterly, 61:245	(2010).










issue	 is	 the	question	of	whether	or	not	 the	beloved,	because	of	his	
character,	is	worth this	kind	of	attentive	affection,	and	where	this	ques-
tion	is	for	him	live	enough	to	animate	his	shame.	Having	spelled	out	
shame’s	 connection	with	vision,	 I	 can	now	state	more	explicitly	 the	
challenge	facing	the	ideal	of	attentive	love	if	it	is	to	foster	connection	
rather	 than	 threaten	 it.	What	attentive	 love	strives	 to	do	(to	see	 the	
beloved	as	he	really	is)	is	exactly	what	prompts	his	shame:	he	is	being	
seen	by	the	other	as	who	(he	fears)	he	really	is.	





and	demonstrate	how	 they	each	exacerbate	 rather	 than	alleviate	es-
trangement	between	lovers.	
IV. Love, Vision, and Connection
To	guide	and	 illustrate	 this	discussion,	 I	will	use	as	an	extended	ex-
ample	Marilynne	Robinson’s	novel,	Home.	In	it,	Glory	faces	a	problem	
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This	marks	an	 important	moment	 in	 the	novel:	an	affirmation	of	
Glory’s	 attitudes	 toward	 Jack.	Earlier	 in	 their	 re-acquaintance,	Glory	


















alienation,	 I	will	 now	 consider	 three	 contemporary	 theories	 of	 love	
that	can	ground	the	appropriateness	and	rationality	of	loving	the	peo-
ple	we	do,	even	when	their	souls	are	in	a	bad	state.	However,	none	







38.	Glory	 is	both	a	morally	good	and	pious	person.	We	also	 learn	 that	Glory’s	
dreams	of	a	simple	family	life	had	been	painfully	shattered	by	a	man	who,	like	
Jack,	took	advantage	of	a	“vulnerable	woman”.
Glory	 is	able	 to	meet	 this	challenge	better	 than	any	of	 the	other	
members	 of	 their	 family	 or	 townsfolk	 of	 Gilead	 who	 become	 reac-








He	 shrugged.	 “I	 think	 you	may	be	mistaking	me	 for	
someone	else.”
“And	I	said	I	liked	it	the	way	it	is.”
“Now	 I	know	you’re	mistaking	me	 for	 someone	else.”	
He	did	not	look	up	from	the	massaging	of	his	hands.	
“I’ve	 thought	 about	 what	 I	 should	 have	 said	 to	 you	
then,	and	I	haven’t	changed	my	mind	at	all.	…	[Y]our	soul	
















37.	Marilynne	 Robinson,	 Home	 (New	 York:	 Farrar,	 Straus	 &	 Giroux,	 2008),	
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42.	 Faith	 is	 expressed	by	 another	 character	 (Lila),	 implicitly	 as	 a	way	 to	 think	
about	Jack:	she	suggests	that	God’s	grace	is	the	understanding	that	everyone 




less”	in	Trouble Will Find Me	(2013).
















toward	 one	 another.39	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 according	 to	 Ryan	 Preston-






I	have	no	objection	 to	 the	claim	 that	 in	many	of	our	 friendships,	
forms	of	epistemic	partiality	are	needed	and	valuable;	 it	 is	also	true	











40.	Ryan	Preston-Roedder,	“Faith	in	Humanity”,	Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research,	87:3	(2013).	













for	his	wellbeing,	would	be	challenged	and	attenuated	 as it in fact is.	
Moreover,	that	his	family	members	remain	committed	to	his	wellbeing	
for	the	simple	reason	that	he	is	their	brother	or	son	only	furthers	his	






virtue	of	 their	 existence	as	 rational	beings.	Others	have	objected	 to	
Velleman	by	denying that	 there	 is	 an	essential	 and	valuable	 feature	
that	all	 rational	beings	share,	or	by	arguing	that	Velleman’s	account,	












See	Ward	E.	 Jones,	 “A	Lover’s	Shame”,	Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,	 15:5	
(2012).	
faith	in	him,	Jack’s	shame	has	already	made	him	touchy	and	resentful	












The	problem	with	 this	kind	of	 love	 is	not	 that	 it	 isn’t	 intelligible,	








him:	a	kind	of	love	that	is	attentive	and	responsive	to	who he is.47 
45.	 “Love	as	Valuing	a	Relationship”.
46.	Niko	Kolodny,	 “Which	Relationships	 Justify	Partiality?	The	Case	of	Parents	
and	Children”,	Philosophy & Public Affairs,	38:1	(2010).






































































In	 other	 words,	 Velleman’s	 Kantian	 view	 relies	 on	 a	 distinction	 be-
tween	a	self	that	is	accessible	to	the	senses	(“the	manifest	person”	or	
“the	empirical	persona”),	and	a	self	(his	“personhood”)	that	is	grasped	
“intellectually”.	When	we	 love	 the	 “empirical	persona”,	 our	 love	 is	 “a	
response	to	[his	manifest	qualities]	as a symbol or reminder of	his	value	
as	a	person”.50	As	Velleman	 then	puts	 this	point,	 “One	doesn’t	want	
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and	fear	that	 if one were to see him as he truly is, he	could	only	inspire	
feelings	of	disappointment,	pity,	or	contempt,	less	attentive	forms	of	
love	do	not	alleviate	his	fear,	but	rather,	serve	to	confirm	it.	
Return	now	 to	 the	 ideal	 of	 attentive	 love,	which	Glory’s	 love	 ex-







of	attentive and	affectionate love	for	his	soul	rather	than	compassion or	
pity, it	doesn’t	risk	being	insulting	or	overbearing.	In	letting	down	his	
guard,	given	Glory’s	affection	for	him,	Jack	allows	himself	to	be	seen	


















“well-like”	 and	 not	 just	 “well-wish”	 a	 villain.	 His	 answer,	 like	 Velle-
man’s,	treats	the	qualities	of	the	villain’s	character	as	of	secondary	or	
non-essential	 importance	 in	 comparison	 to	his	 abstract	humanity or	
personhood:	
…	nobody	 can	have	 such	a	 liking	where	 there	 is	no	ob-
ject	of	which	to	approve.	There	is,	however,	a	distinction	
to	be	drawn	in	a	man	between	the	man	himself	and	his	
humanity.	I may thus have a liking for the humanity, though 






have	affection	 for	 Jack,	as	 long	as	she	believes	 that	 (or	has	 the	 faith	
that)	even	in	the	worst	of	villains,	there	remains	a	kernel	of	good	will.	










54.	 Immanuel	Kant,	Lectures on Ethics,	 trans.	 J.	B.	 Schneewind,	 ed.	 Peter	Heath	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997),	27:418,	my	emphasis.
55.	 This	discussion	 is	not	meant	 to	be	an	exhaustive	consideration	of	 the	vari-
ous	forms	of	love	that	one	might	have	in	response	to	Jack.	Michelle	Mason	








become	endeared	 to	an	object	upon	noticing	 its	possession	of	 such	
qualities,	in virtue of recognizing	its	possession	of	those	qualities.	
There	are	many	everyday	examples	of	this	kind	of	affection	that	I	
could	point	 to,	but	 I’ll	 start	with	an	 illustration	 from	within	philoso-
phy.58	 In	her	discussion	of	what	 she	describes	 as	 “arational”	 actions,	
Rosalind	Hursthouse	proposes	 that	while	 some	aspects of	 our	 emo-
tional	lives	as	human	beings	can	be	“rationalized”	and	made	valuable	










57.	 Adams	 notes	 that	 certain	 undesirable	 qualities	 can	 also	 serve	 as	 qualities	


















above:	 “Nobody	 can	have	 such	a	 liking	where	 there	 is	no	object	of	
which	to	approve”.
The	 ideal	of	attentive	 love	can	respond	 to	 this	challenge,	but	we	








it	 is	 responsive	 to	 qualities	 of	 the	 beloved,	 it	 is	 not	 fundamentally	














more	 amazing	 than	our	 reason”.	The Sea, The Sea (London:	 Penguin	Books,	







would	 interact	with	other	 emotions,	 and	how	graciousness	would	 interact	
with	other	virtues,	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.
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This	 is	 not	 a	 complete	 explanation	 of	 why	 we	 are	 affectionate	






in	mind	some	conception	of	what	human	nature	 is	 like		one	 that	
is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 thick	 psychological	 qualities	 and	 disposi-
tions.	And	what	we	know	about	those	qualities	and	dispositions	will	
inform	the	content of	the	virtues.	For	example,	we	know	that	courage	














the	person who	 is	 the	object	of	our	 love?	Typically	 (perhaps	 ideally),	
these	aspects	of	a	person’s	psychology	will	not	be	fully	tamed	by	vir-
tue	or	brought	in	line	with	moral	obligation	and	duty,	and	may	even	
buck	 up	 against	 its	 constraints.	 But	 importantly,	 they	 nonetheless	
render	him	and	his	actions	what	Peter	Goldie	has	called	“primitively	
intelligible”.64	As	Goldie	argues,	this	kind	of	intelligibility	allows	us	to	
63.	 “Virtues	and	Vices”	 in	Virtues and Vices: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy 
(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002).	
64. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration	 (Oxford:	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	
tears	at	 Joan’s	photo	with	her	nails,	and	gouges	holes	 in	 the	eyes”.60 
My	interest	here	 is	not	 in	Hursthouse’s	arguments	about	 the	nature	








some	 sort	 of	 bond	of	 sympathy.	When	 I	have	 read	 this	
paper	to	discussion	groups,	I	have	found	that	the	list	of	
the	 examples	 at	 the	beginning	 always	provokes	 instant	
delighted	recognition	….61 
Hursthouse’s	 remark	highlights	 the	distinctive	affect	of	 the	emotion	
















































when	 felt	 for	 a	 particular	 human	 being,	 it	 is	 not	 love	 for the	 quali-
ties	of	human	nature	abstractly	understood,	or	the	abstract	concept	of	
and	amplifies	the	horror	of	her	murder	at	Babi	Yar.	Murphy,	“Kant	on	Theory	





































	 Wood’s	 remark	 reminds	us	 that	 it	 is	not	 just	Aristotle	 and	Kant	who	must,	
in	offering	us	powerful	ethical	theories,	strive	to	understand	human	nature	
in	 terms	of	 thick	qualities	of	psychological	disposition,	 and	 so	not	 just	Ar-
istotelians	and	Kantians	could	adopt	 the	 framework	of	grace	 I	am	offering.	
Think	of	Hobbes’	conception	of	human	nature	(fearful,	curious,	and	narrowly	
self-interested);	think	of	Plato’s	(appetitive,	spirited,	always	at	risk	of	illusion).	
Think	 of	 Freud’s.	As	 pointed	out	 by	 Jeffrie	Murphy,	 consider	 the	 love	 that	
one	may	feel	for	Frau	Anna	G,	the	central	figure	of	D.	M.	Thomas’s	novel,	The 
White Hotel,	and	how	the	intimacy	of	one’s	knowledge	and	love	for	her	colors	
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